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Abstract 
 
With  the  current  sovereign  debt  crisis,  the  incompleteness  of  economic  integration  in  the 
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) has become patent leading to an intense debate among 
academics and policy makers. Most of the debate focuses on the needs to strengthen fiscal rules 
and to restore fiscal imbalances through austerity measures which weigh on growth prospects. In 
this paper we analyse current economic developments within the euro area through the lens of 
general equilibrium theory. We address two issues (international sharing of macroeconomics risks 
and coordinated growth stimulation) which are essential to guarantee the sustainability of the 
EMU. More specifically, we propose mechanisms to cope with intergenerational and interregional 
risks while focusing on (fiscally neutral) investments meeting social needs and apt to break the 
vicious circle between fiscal imbalances and stagnation. 
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1. Introduction 
The current crisis of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) combines financial, economic and 
political difficulties that confirm the incompleteness of economic integration in the euro area
5 and 
could even question the sustainability of the EMU itself. 
The current debate on crisis resolution underscores the importance of macroeconomic uncertainties. 
Indeed,  the  current  crisis  was  not  really  anticipated,  and  short-to-medium  term  macroeconomic 
developments in Europe remain highly uncertain today. Although the current crisis has taken its roots 
in financial markets – due to excessive risk-taking behaviour by intermediaries and investors under 
inadequate  monitoring  –  its  macroeconomic  impact  today  puts  downward  pressures  on  both  the 
economic  outlook  and  the  public  finances  for  the  whole  euro  area.  This  reveals  the  urgency  of 
deepening economic integration, a need that remained masked by the favourable developments until 
2007, but that cannot be ignored by a set of countries no longer apt to rely on currency devaluation as 
an adjustment mechanism.  
This paper aims at: (i) interpreting the current situation in the EMU within the framework of General 
Equilibrium  Theory  (GET);  then  (ii)  advancing  some  policy  proposals  rooted  in  that  analysis.  In 
particular, two proposals emerge, that (we feel) do not receive proper attention in today’s policy debates 
– namely international sharing of macroeconomic risks through mutual insurance (Section 2) and growth 
stimulation  through  international  public  investment  programs  (Section  3).  Both  proposals  aim  at 
completing the economic integration of the EMU, which appears necessary to guarantee the viability of 
the monetary union. Section 4 summarises our policy perspectives and immediate recommendations. 
Finally, Section 5 reviews some institutional steps related to their implementation.
6 
7  
Our main goal is to offer a comprehensive, theory-based approach to tackle the current problems of 
the EMU so as to strengthen market confidence in the irreversibility of the monetary union and to 
sustain more positive expectations about macroeconomic trends. To a large extent, our proposition for 
growth stimulation substantiates and concretises for the euro area the project of “Compact for Growth 
and Jobs” endorsed by the European Council on 18 October 2012 for the whole European Union. The 
present paper was written before the release of “Towards a genuine economic and monetary union” by 
Van Rompuy et al. (2012) – hereafter VRetal. Interestingly, the two texts are broadly complementary, in 
spite of sometimes distinct approaches. Thus, VRetal write: “Stronger economic integration is also needed to 
foster coordination and convergence in different domains of policy between euro area countries, address imbalances, and 
ensure the capacity to adjust to shocks and compete in a globalised world economy”. 
"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
5 As discussed in Drudi et al. (2012), the institutional framework of the EMU is incomplete as reflected in the on-going processes aimed 
at implementing the various decisions at the EU level since May 2010. 
6 Each section is largely self-contained and can be read independently. 
7 How to deal with asymmetric macroeconomic shocks within a monetary union received controversial attention at the launch of the 
Euro. For the sake of brevity, we do not review that process, well covered in the literature. See for instance De Grauwe (2012).  %"
"
“International sharing of macroeconomic risks” is one of the central concerns in VRetal; we suggest a 
specific  mechanism  for  such  sharing,  thereby  complementing  VRetal.  Our  concern  for  “growth 
stimulation” is also shared by VRetal, though without centerstage status and without reference to public 
investments. By contrast, VRetal deals extensively with the problems of sovereign overindebtedness 
and  bank  solvency,  that  we  do  not  address.  Furthermore,  VRetal  shares  the  view  that  demand 
stimulation  requires  international  programs,  but  introduces  the  international  dimension  through 
cooperation rather than central definition and implementation; thus, they write (p.10): “An integrated economic policy 
framework is necessary to guide at all times the policies of Member States towards strong and sustainable growth”.   
2. Fiscal Integration and risk sharing 
Terminology: T h e  term  “fiscal  integration”  is  (ab)used  in  the  policy  literature  to  mean  sometimes 
coordinated constraints on fiscal deficits, sometimes full budgetary integration. Our contribution is 
intermediate, as it bears on budgetary transfers resulting from insurance contracts. We try to avoid 
confusion by using the term sparely. 
2.1 Theoretical background 
GET aims at modelling economies as consisting of a set of households that consume commodities and 
supply  labour,  a  set  of  firms  that  produce  commodities  and  employ  labour,  a  set  of  financial 
intermediaries, a public sector that levies taxes and issues transfers, and a central bank that issues a 
currency  (fiat  money).  Commodities  and  labour  are  traded  on  markets.  The  firms  are  owned  by 
households, either directly or through shares traded on stock markets, together with other assets – 
including nominal bonds. The economy operates over time in a framework defined by exogenous states 
of  the  environment  (political  developments,  technology...),  the  progressive  realisation  of  which  is 
described by an event tree. 
Ideally, there could exist at any point in time markets for trading commodities, labour and assets 
contingently on any future event (set of states). Under that idealisation, retained by the neo-liberal creed, 
competitive clearing of all markets could entail “Pareto Efficiency” – that is, attainment of an allocation 
such that no household could be made better off without some other household becoming worse off. 
Among the many departures from that idealisation that real world economies display, one stands out as 
universal: markets are incomplete; that is, markets for trading contingently on any event are notoriously 
absent. One trivial example concerns students at a college or university: they never engage in contingent 
contracts covering their full career under all conceivable circumstances! 
This  transparent  example  is  trivial,  but  there  are  many  important  uncertainties  for  which  market 
insurance does not exist, with serious macroeconomic consequences.
8 For instance, when the EMU 
was set up, none of the Member States could have insured against the kind of adverse developments that 
"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
8 The lack of suitable instruments for sharing macroeconomic risks has been stressed early on by Shiller (1993). &"
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puts some of them today at risk of default. In the same vein, we know today that almost no euro area 
Member State has built financial buffers in good times to face adverse macroeconomic shocks in bad 
times – a feature on which again no insurance was forthcoming. 
The  ubiquitous  market  failure  labelled  “incomplete  markets”  invites  public  policies  aimed  at 
implementing second-best allocations that improve upon those accessible through the existing markets. 
It is important to understand the general nature of such policies if one wishes to meet some of the 
challenges that we are facing today. We address that issue briefly in Section 2.2, before spelling out 
some  of  the  direct  implications  of  market  incompleteness  for  microeconomics  (Section  2.3)  and 
macroeconomics  (Section  2.4).  We  then  address  successively  intergenerational  (Section  2.5)  and 
international  (Section  2.6)  risk  sharing.  And  we  conclude  Section  2  with  a  remark  on  EMU 
membership. 
2.2 Public policies under incomplete markets 
Since  we  aim  at  defining  policies  apt  to  bring  about  more  efficient  risk-sharing  under  incomplete 
markets, it is appropriate to start from the general theory of risk-sharing efficiency. That brings us back 
to Borch’s Theorem (1960):
9 
 “Let N agents each be endowed with a random wealth prospect xi of known probability distribution, 
and with preferences representable by the expectation of a concave function of wealth; then, every 
efficient risk-sharing arrangement calls for pooling all risks and sharing the aggregate wealth X = !i xi among 
all the agents. The share of the aggregate risk borne by each agent is allowed to vary with the level of 
that risk, reflecting individual risk-tolerances. An immediate corollary of Borch’s theorem asserts that 
efficient  global  risk-sharing  could  be  organised  on  a  two-tier  basis,  with  individual  risks  pooled 
efficiently within nations or regions, and aggregate national or regional risks pooled at an upper tier.”
10 
In a standard macroeconomic framework, the “two-tier basis” approach has two natural dimensions: 
the international dimension mentioned in the above quotation, and the intergenerational dimension. To this 
must of course be added the lower-tier interpersonal dimension, of a microeconomic nature, presiding 
over the final allocation among households (and firms) of the risks that remain to be borne nationally, 
after suitable sharing at the two macroeconomic levels mentioned above. 
The intergenerational dimension is a matter of public policy within each country or region because living 
households are unable to share risks with their followers: they may bequest assets, but not net liabilities 
on which their heirs could always renege. In contrast, the public sector shifts liabilities forward through 
"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
9 See Drèze (2000) for a brief overview."
10 Quoted from Drèze (2013), p.3 and footnote 3."'"
"
the public debt.
11 Accordingly, the natural instrument of intergenerational risk-sharing is the fiscal stance 
that determines today’s net addition (positive or negative) to the public debt. 
Two ancillary remarks are worth listing: 
- First, the “net addition” is net of debt-financed productive investments that entail no intergenerational 
transfer. That is, one must always distinguish the current fiscal stance from the capital account. The 
standard rule of a maximal deficit/GDP ratio computed for the sum of the current and capital accounts 
is thus misleading. 
- Second, the “net addition” concerns not only the explicit public debt, consisting of government 
bonds. It also concerns the implicit public debt, consisting mostly of unfunded pension rights. In most 
advanced economies, the latter may amount to 2 or 4 (!) times the former. The standard (Maastricht) 
reference to a debt/GDP ratio reflecting only the explicit debt is thus grossly misleading.
12 
On both accounts, the current practice inspired by the Maastricht Treaty is unsatisfactory and should 
be mended. The goal should be to test whether the policy parameters that underlie the fiscal stance are 
compatible with a balanced budget on average – thus calling for surpluses in good times. Structural 
adjustments of these parameters should accordingly be based on the average fiscal stance, not on its 
current level. We return to that issue in section 2.6.  
2.3 Microeconomic implications of market incompleteness  
Among the microeconomic consequences of market incompleteness, two stand out forcefully. 
First,  incomplete  markets  breed  demand  volatility,  because  postponing  either  (both)  consumption  or 
investment may be desirable, under the prospect of more information tomorrow. Indeed, uncertainty 
about future resources induces more savings, under the generally accepted condition of diminishing 
absolute  risk  aversion.
13  It  is  thus  natural  to  postpone  expenditures  that  are  time-flexible  (e.g.  an 
expensive vacation or a durable good replacement) whenever high uncertainty is apt to diminish over 
time (like today!). This holds in particular for investments, as implied e.g. by Dixit and Pindyck (1994). 
In both cases, the loss associated with postponement is second-order, whereas the gain associated with 
better informed decisions is first-order – a sort of “menu cost” effect. As a result, the balance between 
savings  and  investment  is  recurrently  perturbed  by  the  dynamics  of  information,  a  macroeconomic 
consequence of the first order. 
Second,  incomplete  markets  breed  wage  and  price  rigidities.  The  literature  on  “General  Equilibrium  with 
Incomplete  Markets”  (GEI)  contains  a  striking  result  on  the  generic  inefficiency  of  competitive 
equilibria,  hence  the  generic  second-best  superiority  of  equilibria  with  price  rigidities  and  quantity 
"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
11 This property is obvious for foreign debt. Domestic debt just imposes on future generations the burden of raising taxes to service debt 
that is not matched by productive investments. Evaluating the net burden is a well-known issue in macroeconomics. "
12 At the end of 2007, the gross debt including contingent pension obligations represented up to four times the corresponding gross 
domestic product (GDP) in the euro area and twice the GDP in the United States. See ECB (2010) for further details."
13 See Drèze and Modigliani (1972)."("
"
constraints.
14 The argument for downward wage rigidities cum unemployment benefits is transparent: 
when properly designed, they provide income insurance, and the gain in risk-sharing efficiency outweighs 
the  loss  of  productive  efficiency.
15  The  argument  for  price  rigidities  under  increasing  returns  or 
monopolistic competition or both is slightly more subtle; see Drèze (2001, sec. 3.3) for a non-technical 
outline. 
A very important implication of nominal wage/price rigidities is the existence of multiple equilibria. This 
has been demonstrated for the GEI model in a number of papers, including for instance Citanna et al. 
(2001), Drèze (1997) or Herings (2012). Drèze (2013b) extends the main result to the more realistic 
Temporary General Equilibrium (TGE) model. 
The picture is now closed: in economies with incomplete markets (and no others have ever existed!), 
exogenous  uncertainties  result  in  multiple  equilibria,  so  that  endogenous  uncertainties  compound  the 
exogenous  ones.  Typically,  most  of  the  admissible  equilibria  display  demand  failures  reflecting 
coordination failures and calling for coordinated macroeconomic stimulation policies. Today Europe, 
and the euro area in particular, unquestionably falls in that category – even if the prevailing wage/price 
rigidities need not correspond to second-best policies. 
The property that debt-financed productive investments entail no intergenerational transfers suggests 
that  the  fiscal  stance  be  geared  to  intergenerational  redistribution  and  risk  sharing  while  demand 
stimulation, when needed (like today!), be achieved through public investment. 
2.4 Macroeconomic implications of market incompleteness: growth stimulation through public 
investment 
Regarding demand stimulation, it is important to realise that only global (namely EU or EMU) programs 
make sense: individual countries are too small for the programs to be effective, and too open for the 
programs to be attractive. Indeed, an individual country realises that its national program will largely 
benefit the countries from which it imports (see Figure 1), whereas a foreign deficit will develop at 
home
16;  see  e.g.  Drèze  et  al.  (1988),  also  for  reference  to  the  “early  Mitterand”  and  “German 
locomotive” failures. And of course the inclusion of debt-financed investments in the Maastricht-based 
deficit accounting limits out national initiatives. 
As far as we know, there is no alternative to an ambitious European investment program as a way out of the current 
recession, which the prevailing austerity measures deepen and prolong. That is not to say that austerity 
measures are unnecessary or harmful. But they should be addressed to the average fiscal stance; and they 
should be temporarily complemented by growth enhancing measures, for which investments provide the 
"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
14 See Geanakoplos et al. (1990) or Herings and Polemarchakis (2005)."
15 See Drèze and Gollier (1993). Just imagine how low market-clearing wages for unskilled labour would fall today in absence of minimum 
wages and unemployment benefits!"
16 A striking example of this phenomenon followed the German unification when excess private demand (with respect to capacity 
utilisation in West Germany) was met by an increase of production in neighbouring countries (Benelux, Italy and France in first instance).")"
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only  tool  –  because,  as  explained  above,  they  are  neutral  from  the  viewpoint  of  intergenerational 
redistribution.  
Figure 1 – Share of imports in percentage of GDP for the year 2011 
 
Source: Eurostat 
Of  course,  that  does  not  say  that  any  investment  program  will  do,  nor  that  implementing  such 
programs is easy. The idea would be to advance in time the realisation of valid   investment projects, 
and hence to stimulate aggregate activity, thereby also supporting more optimistic expectations leading 
to faster growth, in particular of employment, when a relatively closed economy (like the euro area) is 
suffering  from  persistent  underutilisation  of  resources.  It  would  not  be  reasonable  in  the  current 
circumstances to propose stimulating the economy through budgetary deficits (fiscal expansion). Better 
identify real economic needs, i.e. investments that would be made anyway in the future, but whose 
realisation could be advanced in time through fiscally neutral subsidies. 
We document summarily in section 3 that such a program could have a quantitatively significantly 
impact on current growth. For just the three sectors that we consider, some 12 to 15 million one-year 
jobs could be created – a definitely significant figure for EMU. 
2.5 Intergenerational risk sharing 
The  distinction  between  intergenerational  redistribution  and  risk  sharing  is  relevant  and  deserves  due 
attention. Ignoring short run fluctuations (including demand failures), a country should decide at each 
period (year?) whether its “net bequests” to future generations are excessive, adequate or insufficient. 
Ignoring provisionally the international dimension, the net bequests consist of human and physical 
capital plus or minus pre-committed transfers between the living and the newborn. (For instance, 
unfunded pension rights entail transfers from the newborn to the living.) The decision would suggest *"
"
adjustments in these bequests: negative if excessive, positive if insufficient. Such adjustments would be 
reflected in the fiscal stance: less surplus or more deficit for negative adjustments, and conversely. 
Think about the fiscal stance as determined primarily by such policy parameters as taxes and social 
contributions on the one hand, transfers or benefits (unemployment, pension, welfare..) and public 
goods on the other hand. Adjustments in these policy parameters would permit implementing the 
desired adjustments. 
Ideally,  a  balanced  budget  could  be  associated  with  an  adequate  level  of  bequests,  thus  revealing 
adequate levels of the policy parameters. At worse, a budget deficit could be associated with insufficient 
bequests, revealing the need to adjust the policy parameters (to adopt “austerity” measures). 
The  foregoing  is  the  subject  matter  of  ongoing  research  labelled  “generational  accounting”  since 
Auerbach et al. (1991). Aside from the difficulties linked to empirical measurement, there is the logical 
difficulty of defining “adequate bequests”. One simple answer defines as adequate a level of bequests 
enabling future generations to maintain real per capita consumption levels similar to those prevailing 
today (with the possible conclusion that current net bequests might be excessive… popular perceptions 
notwithstanding?). This simple answer places a ceiling on the net transfers between the current and 
future generations such that (to a first approximation) the corresponding real interest charge does not 
exceed the expected growth of real national income.
17 
Be that as it may, the relevant point is that intergenerational redistribution should be controlled by the 
choice of policy parameters: this is a long run objective, to be pursued by permanent instruments. In 
contrast,  intergenerational  risk  sharing  is  a  short  run  objective,  properly  pursued  by  temporary 
adjustments of the fiscal stance.  
This conclusion raises the difficult question of defining properly the fiscal stance that implements 
intergenerational  risk  sharing.  An  elementary  example  illustrates.  Consider  a  community  whose 
endowment is subject to a shock: a stationary zero-order Markov process entails a positive or negative 
fixed  shock  with  given  (say  equal)  probabilities.  Let  each  of  N  successive  generations  adjust  its 
consumption  by  (1/N)-th  of  the  shock  it  experiences  and  shift  the  balance  (positive  or  negative) 
forward. In a stationary state, each generation will adjust its consumption by the mean of N shocks, so 
that the variance of its consumption is divided by N.
18 
But there are pitfalls. As the number of generations and N tend to infinity, the cumulative balance of 
past shocks transferred to a new generation is unbounded. That is, for any positive real number R, the 
probability that the cumulative balance of unabsorbed past shocks (i.e. the outstanding debt) exceeds R 
is positive. And the probability that a future generation will have incentives to renege on the scheme is 
always positive.  
"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
17 To a first approximation: this guarantees that the next generation is not prevented from attaining expenditure levels matching those of 
the current generation. 
18  This elementary example is discussed further in Gordon and Varian (1988)."+"
"
It is thus appropriate that some EMU countries advocate structural reforms in those countries where 
intergenerational  redistribution  is  biased  against  the  future.  And  it  is  understandable  that  “fiscal 
integration” is seen by many as consisting in agreed ceilings on public deficits and public debt. But the 
basis on which these ceilings are currently defined leaves much to be desired! And “fiscal integration” 
calls primarily for international sharing of macroeconomic risks. 
2.6 International risk sharing  
Turning to international risk sharing, it follows from the contents of sections 2.2 and 2.3 above that we 
should not be surprised by the prevalence of idiosyncratic macroeconomic shocks at the national (and 
regional)  level.  With  multiple  equilibria  resulting  from  both  wage/price  rigidities  and 
savings/investment imbalances, there is ample scope for national shocks – as confirmed empirically. 
Looking  at  the  economic  developments  in  Europe  over  the  past  decades,  there  are  signs  of 
convergence among EU nations, but with ample departures from monotonicity. Figure 2 displays these 
features by plotting the percentage departures of incomes per capita from the EU average, for the so-
called GIPS (Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain). For comparison, Figure 3 presents comparable data for 
8 US regions. These figures illustrate the fact that the US federation implements risk sharing and 
redistribution among its constituents, whereas the euro area does not!  
Here again, the distinction between redistribution and risk sharing deserves attention. There are debates 
today in the euro area (and the EU to some extent) about the extent to which redistribution among 
Member States should be introduced. The current extent is minimal, with an EU budget of the order of 
1% of GDP. A genuine fiscal integration, consisting not only of common fiscal rules but also of a 
common  budget  (possibly  implemented  stepwise),  would  entail  substantial  redistribution  and  is 
accordingly not in sight. But risk sharing is another matter: it needs not entail any ex ante redistribution, 
but carries definite benefits for all. According to Forni and Reichlin (1999), the extent of risk sharing 
(net of redistribution) among US states is of the order of 30 to 35%; it is minimal in the EU, but could 
potentially reach up to 45%. 
How  would  one  implement  risk  sharing,  free  of  ex-ante  redistribution,  among  euro  area  Member 
States? An ambitious scheme would invite each country to issue long term bonds indexed on its real 
national income. These bonds would be pooled, and each country would receive a share of the pool 
with present value equal to the present value of its own bonds. The scheme would thus implement 
international risk sharing free of ex-ante redistribution. It could, for instance, be applied to 36% of 
national incomes – a percentage close to that of public budgets in national incomes. An interesting 
feature of this scheme is that it entails transfers corresponding to deviations of national macroeconomic 
shocks from the EMU average thus summing to zero. Accordingly, national risk premia will reflect 
covariances of national GDP’s with the EMU average (the CAPM formula), not variances of national 
GDP’s (that might matter for standard issues).  And an important feature is that the bonds issued by a #!"
"
nation are almost entirely held by a pool of foreigners – which would not be guaranteed under a standard 
issue. 
Figure 2 – Per capita GDP gap of Italy, Greece, Spain and Portugal vis-à-vis EU average
19 
 
 
Figure 3 – Per capita GDP of US regions vis-à-vis US average 
 
There are potentially two problems, however – one of principle, namely moral hazard (probably the 
main  reason  why  this  simple  scheme  is  not  part  of  today’s  policy  debate);  and  one  practical,  the 
assessment of present values. Moral hazard is the fear that (partial) mutual insurance would induce 
Member  States  to  seek  immediate  benefits  at  the  cost  of  lower  income  tomorrow.  Because  the 
"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
19 For each of the 4 countries, the “EU average” is computed over the (other) EU members at the time of joining (thus, EU6 minus Italy 
itself, for Italy; EU 9 minus Greece itself for Greece; a.s.o.) and remains such to the end. ##"
"
mutualisation bears on aggregate national incomes, the moral hazard issue does not apply to benefits 
included in national income; it would only apply to such policies as reduced working time or increased 
pension rights, for instance. That observation reduces substantially the scope for moral hazard. 
There is fortunately a further remedy, namely progressive implementation of the scheme. Instead of issuing 
at once perpetual indexed bonds for 36% of their national incomes, countries could agree to issue 
annually, over (say) the coming 12 years, indexed bonds of 12 years maturity for 3% of their national 
income – with successive annual assessments of present values. The partial mutualisation of national 
macroeconomic risks would thus itself be progressive, attaining the target (36%) over 12 years and 
remaining at target forever after. In that case, a policy entailing immediate benefits at the cost of lower 
income tomorrow would reduce the present value of the bonds issued tomorrow. Countries are now 
motivated to pursue growth-enhancing policies so as to improve the terms at which they will float 
bonds tomorrow – an argument already developed by Obstfeld and Peri (1998). 
Admittedly, that progressive scheme reduces the extent of mutualisation for the risks materialising over 
the initial 12 years. This is a reasonable compromise, definitely superior to inaction. An ambitious way 
of overcoming that temporary limitation would consist in backward implementation for the EMU. Indeed, 
the problem raised by national macroeconomic risks was ignored at the launch of EMU, a failure for 
which  all  Member  States  share  responsibility.  Had  that  problem  been  recognised,  and  met  by  the 
progressive scheme outlined above, we would today (12 years later!) enter the permanent regime. It is 
possible to simulate ex post how initial adoption of the progressive scheme would have worked, and to 
proceed today as if the scheme had indeed been implemented from the start. In order to clarify that 
ambitious suggestion, it is necessary to consider first the problem of assessing present values. But the 
very idea of an “as if” approach is provocative. It is logically distinct from a redistributive move, even if 
it looks similar.
20 
There are two ways of implementing our suggestion ex post: with, or alternatively without, settlement 
of the transfers that would have taken place under early implementation. Under the less demanding 
“without” alternative, one simply records the outstanding debts that would have been issued under 
early implementation, and one executes henceforth the associated transfers until they mature (and are 
replaced by new issues); see the Appendix for details and numerical evaluation. 
The issue of assessing present values is challenging. Indeed, medium to long term forecasts of national 
incomes are not available from either market data or official publications. Pending further contributions 
from research in progress, we limit ourselves here to a simple suggestion, developed in the Appendix. 
From existing data, one can estimate average rates of convergence " of national incomes per capita in 
individual countries towards mean incomes in a set of countries, like EMU. (Distinct rates are needed 
for convergence from below and from above, but global balance fixes the ratio of the two.) One can 
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20 A similar logical distinction arises in standard mutualisation of personal risks: if a new disease is covered by compulsory medical 
insurance and all affiliates are covered irrespective of symptoms, is that redistributive? #$"
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then estimate the expected distance after t years between the national income per capita in country c, 
say yct, and the EMU average Yt by applying to yc0/Y0 a correction factor equal to (1 + ")
t. That is, one 
can at time 0 estimate yct by yc0.(Yt /Y0).(1 + ")
t := #yct, thereby reducing the forecasting problem to the 
single series Yt and one (or two) average rates of convergence. Furthermore, forecasting errors on Yt 
will be common to all Member States. But dealing properly with forecasting errors about rates of 
convergence remains an intriguing theoretical challenge, not addressed explicitly at this stage. 
An important side remark concerns the possibility of assessing present values conditionally on national 
policies. An interesting recent contribution of Guntram B. Wolff (2012) recognises the need for some 
form  of  mutualisation  of  the  national  macroeconomic  risks  within  EMU.  Although  he  does  not 
consider  explicitly  the  mutual  insurance  scheme  defined  above,  he  would  probably  regard  it  as  a 
potential alternative to his own proposals (not explicitly derived from efficient risk-sharing theory). In 
addition, Wolff stresses the desirability to “link support to structural reform” in a way “to promote 
change” where desirable. This opens the very intriguing, realistic possibility of linking the assessment of 
our present values to national reform programs through contracts. At the other end, the settlement of 
insurance transfers is automatic – a major advantage. 
We conclude from the foregoing that partial mutual insurance of macroeconomic risks among euro area countries 
is a definite possibility, that should receive high priority on the agenda because otherwise EMU will remain 
recurrently threatened with the very problems that plague it today. 
Remark 3 – VRetal is emphatic on the need to mutualise national macroeconomic shocks through some 
form of insurance – but they link such insurance to a “central fiscal capacity”. Thus, they refer (p. 7) “to 
the establishment of (a central) fiscal capacity to facilitate adjustments to economic shocks. This could take the form of an 
insurance-type mechanism between euro area countries to buffer large country-specific economic shocks... An EMU fiscal 
capacity...  could  take  the  form  of  an  insurance-type  system  between  euro  area  countries.  Contributions  from,  and 
disbursements to, national budgets would fluctuate according to each country’s position over the economic cycle”. Turning 
to the “specific design of such a function”, VRetal mention “two broad approaches. The first would be a 
macroeconomic approach... The second could be based on a microeconomic approach... such as unemployment insurance”
21. 
Our reliance on efficient risk-sharing theory leads to the more specific conclusion of opting for the 
macroeconomic approach, without requiring a “fiscal capacity”. 
2.7 A remark on EMU membership 
Once the need to mutualise idiosyncratic macroeconomic shocks within a monetary union is accepted, 
the following general remark about EMU itself can be made.  
Standard GET looks at money exclusively as a means of payment; see e.g. Drèze and Polemarchakis 
(2001). Recent developments have underscored the other role of money as a source of liquidity, in 
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21 A similar duality appears in Wolff (2012), who does however conclude with a preference for the macroeconomic approach. #%"
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particular to the public sector. And the choice between national currencies and a monetary union brings 
in the foreign dimension. 
A country facing today the choice between using a national currency or joining (or not quitting) EMU 
will have to weigh two aspects. The national currency entails automatic funding of fiscal or foreign 
account deficits, with some measure of international risk sharing, but at the cost of more inflation 
uncertainty. In principle, the exchange rate adjusts so that the present value of foreign balances matches 
the net value of foreign assets and liabilities.
22 Thus, a macroeconomic shock entailing a balance of 
payments deficit leads to devaluation of the national currency at a gain in competitiveness but at the 
cost of inflationary pressure. To the extent that foreigners hold assets denominated in the national 
currency, there is an element of international risk sharing. But the domestic inflation is costly under 
nominal rigidities, some of which may serve a useful function of domestic risk sharing. And one should 
not ignore the possibility of volatile, misinformed adjustments in exchange rates. 
In order for a monetary union to improve upon these prospects, it is essential that the union be a 
realistic project. That requires a realistic starting point and a measure of macroeconomic risk sharing. 
EMU failed on both scores, and thus needs reshaping. One dimension concerns the foreign account. In 
a union, foreign deficits must be met through a combination of (i) domestic adjustments in prices, 
wages and the fiscal stance (“pervasive austerity”), and (ii) capital transfers from abroad. Both lines 
should be pursued today in the GIPS countries. The coordinated public investment programs discussed 
in Section 3 below could help on both counts. But there remains genuine uncertainty about the extent 
to which (the horizon over which) a country like Greece can balance its foreign account. Some definite 
assistance from EMU itself may well be needed. 
Still,  our  main  message  remains  that  finding  a  mechanism  to  absorb  idiosyncratic  macroeconomic 
shocks does not require a fully integrated federal budget, as recommended for instance in  Delpla and 
von Weizsäcker (2011) or in Chadha et al. (2012). And the risk of moral hazard stressed in Goodhart 
and Smits (1993) can be substantially reduced through our step-wise approach.  
3. Stimulating growth in Europe through (public) investment 
Most European investments take the form of (uncoordinated) national policies, sometimes geared to 
global objectives decided at the EU level (e.g. for energy policy). However, targeting some investments 
at the same time for several countries through coordinated policies – under which supply of inputs and 
outputs would be properly distributed among Member States – should entail positive externalities. 
Coordinating  aggregate  demand  (macro-stimulation)  policies  at  the  global  level  would  contain 
macroeconomic volatility and avoid windfall effects or free-rider behaviour across countries, which is 
highly desirable within a monetary union like the EMU (see Uhlig, 2002). 
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22 See for instance Sarno and Taylor (2002)."#&"
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3.1 Which investments to investigate? 
Under  a  common  program  of  growth  stimulation  through  investment,  two  kinds  of  investments 
deserve attention, namely public investments
23 and selective private investments. 
The three broad areas that appear most appropriate from our viewpoint are: (i) social housing; (ii) 
renewable energy; and (iii) transportation (from urban to cross-national). Social housing is the more 
transparent area. New low-cost dwellings already planned are readily identified and do not fall under 
our program. However, additional dwellings can be supplied by public agencies, or alternatively by 
private firms. In order to advance in time investments that would anyhow take place later, one needs to 
provide funding to the public agencies (more on this under 3.5 below), or incentives to the private 
firms. The rationale for private incentives rests on the gap between the private and the social cost of 
labour  during  a  recession.  A  general  case  can  be  made  for  adjusting  social  security  contributions 
cyclically so as to reduce that gap; see Drèze (1993). Short of a comprehensive program of cyclical 
adjustments, employers’ social security contributions could be reduced temporarily on additional investments 
undertaken as part of a European demand stimulation program. If the reductions correspond to the 
associated savings for the public sector, namely more fiscal revenue and less unemployment benefits, 
then the program is fiscally neutral – yet generates net social benefits through less unemployment (a 
domestic benefit) and more demand (a partly exported benefit). 
In order to reach our ambitious goals, the investments should meet some conditions or priorities: 
a. the investments must be economically valid, i.e. entail social returns covering their social cost; with a 
preference for projects that entail financial rather than immaterial returns and are thus easier to finance; 
b. the investments can be identified as additional, in the sense that their realisation is not planned for the 
immediate future, but could be advanced in time through either centralised public funding or temporary 
(additional) subsidies; ideally, such subsidies should be fiscally neutral; 
c. identify valid investment projects which suffer from “market imperfections”,  i.e. which either (i) are 
not seen by the private sector as profitable at market prices, but would be undertaken if the fiscally 
neutral subsidy scheme is implemented; or (ii) are subject to externalities ignored by the private sector 
(including possibly external productivity gains); 
d. look for labour intensive projects, with main reliance on types of labour that are definitely in excess 
supply; 
e. look for projects that can be distributed across the Member States in a way that privileges the 
countries in greater need of demand stimulation. 
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23 Recent evidence suggests that public investment stimulates growth more effectively than public consumption. For Japan during the 
1990s, Brückner and Tuladha (2010) also show that while public investment may yield higher output effects than other spending, its 
effectiveness depends upon its composition, the level of government implementation, and supply side factors."#'"
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Although there are certainly other sectors worth investigating, the three sectors that we privilege are of 
particular interest for several reasons. First, they all meet social needs in every euro area country, as well 
as specific policy targets (including production of green energy and reduction of gas emissions). Second, 
investments in these sectors are all labour intensive. Third, they appear fiscally realistic, i.e. they require 
limited net financial support by the public sector (thanks in part to decreased unemployment). Last but 
not least, they could ensure a more balanced distribution of capital across euro area countries.  
At this stage, our main purpose is not to offer a complete feasibility study, but rather to provide some 
order of magnitude to quantify the potential of our proposal – an order that proves very substantial. And 
we encourage the authorities to launch (or pursue) right now a detailed investigation of needs and of 
feasible projects in these three sectors of activity. A summary of some key features for each sector is 
provided by Table 7 in Annex I. 
3.2 Low-cost housing 
A first sector of interest is certainly low-cost housing. The reasons for privileging housing come from 
the combination of meeting unfilled needs
24, easily identifying marginal investments and stimulating 
relatively  labour-intensive  investments.  In  addition,  the  supply-response  of  the  building  sector  is 
relatively elastic. At the same time the rents, capped on social grounds, are always insufficient to cover 
the corresponding building costs, hence reducing investment by the private sector under the prevailing 
price (labour cost) distortion. As a result, the burden of this type of investment falls primarily on the 
public sector, resulting in turn in relatively high unsatisfied demand due to states’ budget constraints. By 
correcting the price distortion in a fiscally neutral way, the stimulation of private investment could be 
relatively important and hence significant for growth. 
It lies beyond the scope of this article to detail a possible investment program in low-cost housing for 
the whole euro area. However, useful proxies can be derived from the experience of some countries. In 
France – where investing in low-cost housing is discussed by the newly elected government – it appears 
that some 3 million people are homeless or inadequately housed, corresponding to the lack of some 1.2 
to 1.5 million dwellings.
25 With some 500,000 to 800,000 units currently in progress or plan, the deficit 
amounts to some 700,000 dwellings. Now, considering an average cost of some ! 137,400 per dwelling, 
a total investment of about ! 96.2 billion might be needed to respond to this unsatisfied demand. Since 
France has about one fifth of the euro area population, a similar program for the whole euro area 
would reach around ! 500 billion.
26 Of course, this estimation assumes that similar unsatisfied needs 
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24 This unsatisfied demand partly reflects the changing composition of population (e.g. due to a growing proportion of single parental 
families) and changing needs (e.g. to adjust to unemployment or lower salary). 
25 See “Logements sociaux. Un document unique pour les demandes à partir d'octobre”. 
http://www.letelegramme.com/ig/generales/france-monde/france/logements-sociaux-un-document-unique-pour-les-demandes-a-partir-
d-octobre-03-05-2010-897295.php. See also Social housing in EU II available at  
http://www2.lse.ac.uk/geographyAndEnvironment/research/london/pdf/Social%20Housing%20II/Social_Housing_in_Europe_II_A_
review_of_policies_and_outcomes.pdf. 
26  If we plan 700.000 additional dwellings in France , this would amount to ! bn 481=(137,400*700,000*5) in EMU.  #("
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prevail  on  average  in  other  euro  area  countries.  Yet,  similar  figures  for  the  region  of  Wallony  in 
Belgium already appeared in Drèze et al. (1999).
27 
The impact of such a program on employment could be considerable. Following recent estimates
28, 
building new dwellings could require 10 to 12 full-time equivalent (FTE) man-years per ! million 
invested (against only 8.1 FTE for public investment in infrastructures). Therefore, a program for the 
whole euro area could create up to 5 million one-year jobs.
29 Another advantage of housing investment 
is that it requires a mix of skilled and non-skilled workers while offering to the latter the possibility of 
real-time training.
30  
On  the  financial  side,  a  major  advantage  of  social  housing  investment  is  that  future  benefits  are 
matched by rent receipts, permitting the service of “project bonds” – that could in addition be covered 
by mortgages on the new buildings. Funding for public investments should thus be possible, in spite of 
the current budget constraints.  
As for private investments, which could hopefully constitute the bulk of the program, the relevant 
question is: could fiscally neutral subsidies provide adequate incentives for additional investments? In 
light of the considerations in section 3.1, our proposal is to promote investment through reduced 
employer social security contributions by an amount equal to the difference between the private and the 
social cost of labour. One way to estimate the size of such a subsidy starts from rental costs. For France 
again, a normal market rental cost (for a house costing ! 137,400) is about ! 508 a month (thus 
representing a nominal return of 4.4% of the amount invested which seems reasonable by historical 
standards and well above current returns on financial investments). However, the rental cost for social 
housing is set at ! 325 a month on average.
31 Based on these figures, a subsidy of about 35% (183/508) 
could be sufficient to encourage the private sector to participate in our housing program.
32 According 
to the estimation (under reasonable assumptions) of the wedge between the private and social labour 
costs, such a subsidy rate appears to be fiscally neutral.
33  
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27 Indeed, figures for Wallony translated to the European level amounted to some ! 373 billion for an average construction cost of about 
! 86,000 per dwelling. See Drèze et al. (1999) for details.  
28 Estimations made by National Federation of Public Works and the Ministry of Sustainable Development (on the basis of statistical data 
provided by the INSEE) reported in Cabinet Relance (2009). According to that source, one million ! of investment in housing renovation 
would create 16.6 FTE in total (including both direct and indirect employment through outsourcing activities outside the construction 
sector and production of intermediate goods). From these calculations, the ratio between the total and direct employment effects would 
be 1.28 on average. Again this figure is very similar to that reported in Drèze et al. (1999) for Belgian data. 
29 Again this figure assumes an impact of housing investment on employment in other euro area countries similar to the ratios calculated 
for the French economy. Similar ratios were already obtained for the Belgian economy in Drèze et al. (1999). 
30 Past experiences reveal that unskilled workers could be gradually trained by skilled workers on specific sites. This strategy is regularly 
used by the construction sector when replacing retiring workers by new workers out of school and traineeship programmes. 
31 See  
http://www2.lse.ac.uk/geographyAndEnvironment/research/london/pdf/Social%20Housing%20II/Social_Housing_in_Europe_II_A_
review_of_policies_and_outcomes.pdf 
32 Again, a subsidy of between 25-28% was obtained for Belgium in Drèze et al. (1999). Of course, it is important to note that the very 
high housing prices in some regions within the euro area may probably require higher a subvention rate at similar social rent due to the 
price of ground. Detailed case-by-case studies are needed. 
33 As recalled in Drèze et al. (1999), this wedge could be approximated by the following formula:  
(1-RR/2)S+RR/2=S+(1-S)RR/2 
where S denotes the share of social contributions and income taxes in the labour cost and RR the replacement ratio. Estimating it for 
France (in order to have comparable figures) and setting RR at 40%, we obtain a wedge of around 52% (using the labour costs estimation #)"
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Besides new dwellings, two other avenues should be investigated: (a) transformation of vacant houses 
into smaller dwellings for low-income households
34; and (b) renovation of existing low-cost housing to 
equip them with more modern and less energy-consuming facilities. Such a possibility should not be 
ruled  out  given  the  employment  content  of  renovation,  which  is  often  higher  than  for  new 
construction. 
3.3 Renewable energies 
In January 2007 the European Commission put forward an integrated proposal that addressed the 
issues of energy supply, climate change and industrial development. Following the decision two months 
later by the European Heads of State to adopt an Energy Policy for Europe, a plan was agreed calling 
by the year 2020 for: (i) 20% energy saving; (ii) 20% reduction in greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions; (iii) 
20%  share  of  renewable  energies  in  overall  EU  energy  consumption;  (iv)  10%  renewable  energy 
component in transport fuel.
35  
Today, the installed capacity of renewable energies amounts to 145.6 GW (with 64%, 34% and 2% 
respectively of wind power, photovoltaic PV systems and concentrated solar CSP systems), which 
represents slightly less than 10% of EU energy consumption. It is thus expected that this capacity will 
increase by 153 GW by 2020 to meet the EU’s objective. Keeping unchanged today’s proportion of 
each type of green energy in the total of renewable energies and using an average investment cost for 
each type, an increase in installed capacity of 153 GW would cost ! 343 billion.
36 
Investment in renewable energies is labour intensive
37, although it requires skilled labour. According to 
available public information, any new MW installed in renewable energies could lead to the creation of 
about 11, 15 and 20 full-time equivalent (FTE) one-year jobs respectively for the CSP, the wind power 
and the PV systems. Given the average investment cost for each type of green energy
38, each new 
investment of ! 1.6 million in wind energy would generate around 15 FTE one-year jobs on average - 
against 20 FTE for an investment of ! 2.6 million in the PV system, but only 11 FTE for an investment 
of more than ! 5 million in the CSP system. Consequently, an investment programme of ! 600 billion 
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from the OECD for the year 2011). With a share of labour in value added of residential construction of about 60%, the total private costs 
could exceed total social costs by some 30%."
34 In a country like Spain suffering from the burst of housing bubbles the feasibility of transforming vacant housing (due to the recession) 
into less expensive ones to meet demand by low-income population should be carefully studied. Unfortunately, the absence of data has 
impeded this exercise. 
35 See also European Commission (1997, 2009). 
36 This total is based on an average investment cost for each type of green energy calculated as the arithmetic average of upper price 
interval mentioned in footnote 34 below. In practice, an average cost of ! 1825/kW, ! 2690/kW and ! 6800/kW have been used 
respectively for the wind power, PV system and CSP system. Such a calculation is approximate in nature and will have to be refined in a 
more detailed study. 
37 According to the European Wind Energy Association (EWEA), a total of around 253,145 workers were employed by the European 
wind energy sector in 2012 – either directly (60%) or indirectly (40%). Similarly, the European solar industry employed 268,110 workers 
in 2012, according to the Observatory of renewable energies (EurObserv’ER). 
38 More specifically, the investment cost in wind energy ranges from !1,000 to ! 1,350/kW (for onshore installation) and from ! 2,000 to 
! 2,300/kW (for offshore installation). This cost amounts to ! 2,690/ kW on average for the PV system while it ranges from ! 3,500 to ! 
5,600/kW (without storage) and from ! 4,000 to ! 8,000/kW (with storage) for CSP. See details in Table 7 in Annex I and in the 
corresponding sources. #*"
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(still short of the 1.000 billion foreseen by the European Commission
39) could create up to around 5 
million one-year jobs. Thus, the impact of investment in green energies on employment could be of the 
same magnitude as that in low-cost housing.
40 
European countries have set their own objectives within the guidelines adopted by the Heads of State 
without specific coordination in terms of investment path and subsidy policy. At the same time, many 
countries try to invest globally (namely in various green energies) whereas exposure to various types of 
renewable energy clearly differs from country to country
41 (see Annex II). 
One of the key distinguishing features of renewable energy is that current investment is mostly made by 
the private sector, reflecting a high level of subsidies of various forms. Contrary to low-cost housing 
where private investment is lacking due to the profitability constraint, financial returns on investment in 
renewable energies appear to be high in comparison with other financial investments.
42 However, this 
profitability  is  entirely  due  to  government  support  which  is  eventually  paid  by  the  final  electricity 
consumer (either through taxation in case of lump sum subsidies or through higher price of electricity 
in case of feed-in tariffs). Consequently, the subsidies are pro-cyclical and tend to decrease in periods 
when support to economic growth is most needed.  
Against this background, several elements call in favour of better cooperation at the EMU or EU level. 
First, the incentives for private investments are strongly dependent on the government support scheme. 
Changes in the conditions of government support may dramatically affect the expected investments in 
the energy sector. This is the case for instance of Spain today where decreases in the feed-in tariffs (to 
limit increases of electricity prices to final consumers) have led to a sudden stop of investments in the 
CSP sector.
43 Second, the complexity and country-specific characteristics of the legislation may reduce 
incentives of investors to have a cross-country approach for their investments. Third, setting targets by 
a certain deadline for green energy production while leaving the type and the speed of investments to 
national initiatives may imply two problems from the economic viewpoint in a monetary union. On the 
one hand, this may lead to misallocation of resources with investments not located optimally in the 
EMU  (e.g.  solar  systems  in  the  northern  countries).  On  the  other  hand,  uncoordinated  timing  of 
investments across countries may imply phases of overheating and subsequent sharp decline in demand 
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39 See http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/financial_operations/investment/europe_2020/investment_needs_en.htm. 
40 It is however worth noting that professionals in each sector of renewable energy expect decreasing investment costs in the future. 
41 For instance, 98% of the current capacity of wind energy consists of onshore wind power installations with Germany and Spain as the 
main producers (representing together 54% of the total capacity installed in the European Union) while the remaining 2% of wind power 
capacity are installed in northern European countries led by Denmark, Ireland, The Netherlands, Sweden and the United Kingdom (UK). 
For solar energy, 56% of  PV systems are located in Germany while 75% CSP systems are located in Spain. 
42 Subject to the renewable energy considered, the gross return on equity provided by these arrangements may reach up to 12% according 
to calculations by Hoffmann (2011). It could then be advisable to encourage local public agencies (regions, cities…) to invest more in 
such profitable projects."
43 See for instance 
http://www.solarserver.com/solar-magazine/solar-news/current/2012/kw05/spanish-government-halts-pv-csp-feed-in-tariffs.html and 
http://www.wind-works.org/FeedLaws/Spain/SpanishFITUpdateTemporaryHalttoNewRenewableEnergyProjects.html"#+"
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of raw material for green energy investments. Ultimately, this may cause industrial failures which are 
socially and fiscally costly.
44 
Our  recommendation  for  renewable  energies  is  to  advance  in  time  expected  investments  while 
maintaining the national subsidy schemes in place.  In addition, we strongly support the establishment 
of a framework for energy transportation across countries within the euro area.
45 And we recommend 
studying a flexible mechanism to smooth investment across business cycles. An illustrative example of 
such a mechanism is provided in Annex III. 
3.4 Transportation 
Another example of possible investment coordinated at the EMU (or EU) level is transportation, from 
urban to cross-national. Although transportation investment is foremost pursued for mobility purposes, 
it also generates positive externalities: reduction in pollution (e.g. greenhouse gas), in vehicle operating 
costs and in transportation-related accidents; and employment stimulation through improved labour 
market access for commuters.
46 Even if researchers in this field have warned against the danger to 
“double count” the benefits of a transportation project (see e.g. Wheaton (1977) and Boarnet (1997)) in 
a  cost-benefit  analysis  (Gramlich  1997),  it  is  recognised  that  investment  in  transportation  may 
contribute significantly to increase economic growth and economic integration between countries. Both 
elements are of particular relevance in the case of a monetary union like EMU. 
Investment  prospects  are  sizeable.  The  European  Commission  estimates  that  the  needs  in 
infrastructures in Europe (such as roads, railways, broadband and gas pipelines) amount up to ! 2,000 
billion.
47 This amount includes at least ! 500 billion to complete the trans-European transport networks 
in the context of the European Union’s ten-year growth strategy (Europe 2020). This explains the 
launch of the seven flagships initiatives derived from Europe 2020. As a result, it has been decided to 
set  transportation  among  the  key  priorities  for  the  pilot  phase  of  the  Europe  2020  Project  Bond 
Initiative. In this context, investments for an amount up to ! 31.7 billion are expected by 2020 with a 
special focus on (green and sustainable) cross-nation modes.
48 
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44 See for instance http://www.lemonde.fr/planete/article/2012/04/03/photovoltaique-l-offre-est-aujourd-hui-deux-fois-superieure-a-la-
demande_1679531_3244.html and http://www.journaldunet.com/economie/energie/faillite-panneau-solaire.shtml  
and http://www.huffingtonpost.fr/2012/07/16/solaire-photovoltaique-en-france-les-raisons-du-crash-en-plein-vol_n_1675372.html. 
45 The importance to strengthen the cross-border energy transportation has been emphasised by the European Commission since the 
early 2000s putting the trans-European energy networks among the priorities for infrastructure investments. See for instance European 
Commission (2007, 2010). This has been revived in July 2012 in the context of the pilot phase of the Europe 2020 Project Bond 
Initiative. In particular, it has been announced that investments of an amount of ! 9.1 billion to facilitate transfer of (both traditional and 
renewable) energy between countries should take place by 2020 through this initiative in the context of the ten-year growth strategy. See 
also http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/index_en.htm and http://ec.europa.eu/energy/index_en.htm. 
46 For a summary of the U.S. literature, see, e.g., Ihlanfeldt and Sjoquist (1998). See also World Bank (2007), Roy, R. (2008), Rodrigue et 
al. (2009), Gilbert, J. and Nilanjan, B. (2010). 
47 This estimation by the European Commission was provided in the context of the communication related to the establishment of the 
European Structural Funds and the launch of the pilot phase of the Europe 2020 Project Bond Initiative established by Regulation No. 
670/2012, published in the Official Journal L 204/1 of 31/07/2012. 
See http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/financial_operations/investment/europe_2020/investment_needs_en.htm. 
48 See http://ec.europa.eu/transport/index_en.htm. $!"
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Interestingly, the work of European Commission services includes the definition of specific projects 
(30 for cross-nation road and rail
49), so that the delay required to implement our program would be 
minimal in this case. 
Unfortunately we were not able to find accurate estimates of employment ratios for investment in 
transportation, which should be assessed on a case-by-case basis. The only global estimations at our 
disposal are those reported in Cabinet Relance (2009) for the French economy. According to this 
report, the employment impact of investment in infrastructures could amount to between 8 and 10 
FTE man-years per ! million of investment, i.e. as labour intensive as the examples discussed in the 
previous sections. Indeed, an investment of about ! 500 billion in transportation could create up to 
between  4  and  5  million  one-year  jobs.  We  only  mention  this  example  to  encourage  further 
investigation:  the  information  at  our  disposal  at  this  stage  is  too  limited  to  provide  any  order  of 
magnitude (even roughly) of possible investment amounts.
50 
3.5 Funding a public investment program 
Given the objective of stimulating growth (and growth expectations) through investments, it is obvious 
that these investments should be financed by bonds, not by reduced spending elsewhere. That may well 
be the reason why our proposal receives so little attention today. Yet, it is undeniable that economically 
sound investments do not alter the allocation of resources between the current and future generations. 
The only sensible reservation one might have about bond-financed investments must accordingly come 
from the fear that financial markets could not readily absorb the corresponding bond issues. But that 
fear must be appraised at the world level: economically sound investments remain sound under external 
funding! At that level, there is no problem of size, the only concern bears on solvability of the issuers. 
Actually,  euro-denominated  safe  bonds  would  be  a  welcome  addition  to  the  portfolio  choices  of 
surplus countries. So, the main issue is to decide who should issue the bonds financing an EMU 
integrated investment program. 
One element of answer is immediate: the Member States whose sovereign bonds are currently under 
distrust should not be involved! How should then public investments in these countries be financed? 
(The question is all the more relevant that one would hope to privilege investments in the countries 
suffering most from the austerity dilemma.) The more natural answer is: by bonds issued at the EMU 
level – for instance through the EIB or the EBRD; or by project bonds.
51 But the size we have in mind 
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49 See http://ec.europa.eu/transport/themes/infrastructure/maps/doc/ten-t_pp_axes_projects_2005.pdf. 
50 The only rough estimation known to us of investment costs for urban transportation in big cities in advanced economies fluctuates 
between ! 10 million per km (for bus rapid transit) and ! 60 million per km (for mass rapid transit like the metro). See AFD (2009) for 
more details. For cross-nation transportation, a recent estimation is related to the high-speed train (TGV) project between France (Lyon) 
and Italy (Turin) which could eventually cost ! 26.1 billion (including the recent agreement between French and Italian government on 3 
December 2012 for the sole tunnel of 57 km for an amount of ! 8.5 billion). For the part of the project supported by the French 
government,  the  cost  would  amount  to  ! 7 . 7  b i l l i o n  f o r  1 4 0 k m ,  i . e .  ! 5 5  m i l l i o n  p e r  k m  o n  a v e r a g e .  M o r e  d e t a i l s  a v a i l a b l e  a t  
http://www.lyon-turin.info/le-projet/le-trace. 
51 For the pilot phase of the Europe 2020 Project Bond Initiative, see 
 http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/financial_operations/investment/europe_2020/index_en.htm. $#"
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might exceed the scope of these channels. Direct issue of bonds by EMU itself may be called for, and 
the modalities of such issues should be investigated by instances in charge of these matters. 
These modalities could be complex. Think about social housing investments in Spain, financed by 
bonds issued by some EMU-level instance. If the investment is public, so is the ownership of the 
dwellings. Does it go to the EMU instance, or to Spanish authorities with a mortgage for the EMU 
instance?  Clearly,  a  contract  is  called  for.  And  similar  remarks  will  apply  to  many  cases.  A  guiding 
principle should be to mutualise risks whenever possible. Beyond that, there is room for creativity! 
Regarding  private  investments,  we  simply  refer  to  the  various  possibilities  developed  under  PPP 
(public/private partnerships – see for instance Alshawi (2009)) 
       4. Policy perspectives and recommendations 
On the basis of our theoretical survey in section 2, and of our verification in section 3 of the wide 
scope for programs of public investment at the euro area level, we may outline the major innovations in 
the economic organisation of the euro area that we would look for, as an intermediate step on the road 
to  fuller  integration.  These  innovations  would,  in  our  opinion,  endow  the  EMU  with  structural 
characteristics ensuring its viability. 
A. Organise mutual insurance of national macroeconomic risks through annual exchange of medium-term 
bonds  indexed  on  a  country’s  national  income  against  similar  bonds  indexed  on  aggregate  EMU 
income. In an ex ante non-redistributive spirit, the terms of exchange should reflect the present values 
of national incomes until maturity of the bonds. These terms of exchange could be embedded in 
contracts regarding national economic policies.
52 
B. Let EMU Member States issue sovereign debt indexed on national incomes, also to redeem (with haircuts) 
extant sovereign debt in those countries where it is currently under distrust.
53  
C. Locate responsibility for demand stimulation policies (when appropriate, as today) at the EMU level 
with public investment programs as the privileged instrument. The national implementation and funding of 
such EMU programs could be embedded in contracts regarding national economic policies. 
D. Let the structural economic policies of Member States aim at a fair intergenerational allocation of 
resources implying sustainable debt levels. Deviations (positive or negative) from that rule on grounds of 
intergenerational risk sharing should be allowed on a strictly temporary basis. Ideally, these temporary 
departures from balanced budgets should be mutualised internationally. These principles should guide 
the contracts regarding national economic policies as well as the decisions about demand stimulation.
54 
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52 Backward implementation of this proposal is also possible, as explained in section 2.6 and the Appendix. 
53 These bonds would not be held by commercial banks, but bonds issued to finance public investments would provide substitutes. 
54 Although beyond the scope of this article, it is obvious that our proposals should ideally be accompanied by microeconomic measures 
favouring entrepreneurship and innovation.  $$"
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Items A, B and C are transparent, and hopefully attractive. They correspond to genuine innovations, 
relative  to  current  EU/EMU  practices,  and  would  accordingly  call  for  some  policy  planning  and 
institutional reforms. These will require time, so that we need to consider what immediate steps could 
pave the way for these reforms. Item D is less transparent, yet no less important. If national economic 
policies are to be evaluated and (re)oriented at EMU level, a convincing theoretical basis is indispensable. Item 
D points to the need of reconsidering in depth the logic of the Maastricht Treaty, while fully achieving 
that treaty’s objective of debt sustainability. We do not expect that item to be readily accepted by all 
parties concerned. The immediate goal here should be to trigger in-depth analysis and debate.  
The delays inherent in items A and C might be regarded by some as disqualifying. We regard these 
items as indispensable permanent improvements – and crucial strengthening – of the EMU structure, 
that need to be thought through in depth and promoted with vigour. The fact that delays are involved 
leads to a clear conclusion: let us start at once, without wasting a minute!
55 
Regarding immediate steps, we (together with many others) assign top priority to escaping the blind alley 
of unilateral austerity and to restoring growth, also through more positive expectations. As stated in 
sections 2.2/2.3, we see no alternative to an ambitious EMU public investment program, i.e. item C. 
The idea of vesting responsibility for such a program with EU/EMU authorities is just a step forward 
along a familiar avenue. But the explicit demand stimulation aspect is new, and may call for institutional 
reform. The nature of these reforms should be explored at once. The implied delay should be used in 
parallel to explore and define specific investment programs. As a first step, we have documented in 
section 3 the wide possibilities opened by three broad domains. We call for immediate systematic 
exploration of these domains, so that specific programs be ready for launching as soon as the green 
light comes. And we invite others to suggest additional domains meeting the criteria outlined in section 
3.1. 
Concerning item A, the need to organise some mutualisation of national macroeconomic risks is widely 
recognised today; but the form of insurance advocated here is not considered explicitly, as far as we 
know. So the first step is to subject our proposal to discussion and further exploration. Hopefully, that 
could be part of the reactions to the VRetal report, within which our proposal fits naturally. In parallel, 
the  issue  of  assessing  the  present  values  of  medium  term  national  incomes  should  be  studied  by 
experts. Also, experimental launching of bonds indexed on national incomes, and on aggregate EMU 
income, could be undertaken shortly. 
As for item B, we bring it to the attention of those concerned with sovereign debt restructuring.  
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55 Drèze wishes to share the following reminiscence: “In the fall of 2008, I invited three colleagues from other universities to join me in 
inviting the EU Commission to study joint investment programs that could be enacted from 2010 on IF the recession lingered. All three 
objected that excessive delays were involved and supported instead short run measures like VAT rebates. How sad that I did not pursue 
the invitation on my own!”. 
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Taken together, these immediate steps would bring some fresh air to the current debates and could 
hopefully result in further innovative suggestions. They should impact positively the expectations about 
the future of EMU – and enhance the acceptability of the austerity measures where they remain needed. 
5. Institutional considerations relating to the decision-making process 
The above proposals would bring to the euro area an “economic policy” dimension, with associated 
institutional requirements. Although that dimension could be assumed by the EU itself, the euro area is 
the more natural level, because the policies would be geared to the specific needs of a set of countries 
sharing a common currency. Also, the prospects for effectiveness of a rather ambitious program are 
better in a tighter community also benefiting from the qualified majority voting rule (used for economic 
governance)
56.  And  the  recent  creation  of  the  EMU  Summit,  chaired  by  Herman  Van  Rompuy, 
provides the key institution needed to guide the whole process. 
Ideally, we would plead for: 
 - an “Economic Council of the Euro Area”, bringing together governmental representatives of the 
euro area Member States, along the lines of the Euro Group; 
- an “Euro Area Economic Directorate”, whose professional staff would assist the Council towards 
defining policies and implementing them, along the lines of the EFC;
57   
- an “Eurozone Economic Research Unit” (possibly integrated in the Joint Research Center of the 
Commission), in charge of mid-to-long term forecasts of national incomes, of desired levels of demand 
stimulation, of specific investment projects and their funding, and the like; 
-  an  “Eurozone  Council  of  Economic  Advisers”,  modelled  after  the  US  Council  though  perhaps 
somewhat  less  ambitious  budgetwise.  This  could  be  a  welcome  step  towards  closer  cooperation 
between  academic  and  staff  economists,  which  remains  underdeveloped  in  Europe.  And  it  would 
provide the natural instance to take charge of item D above. 
In  a  sense,  these  institutional  proposals  simply  extend  to  the  economic  sphere  the  arrangements 
prevailing for the monetary/financial sphere of EMU. Their preparation will require time and effort; it 
could be entrusted by the EMU Summit to the Commission services (with an invitation to consult 
academics...). Their implementation could be subject to the double legal basis 136 TFEU and 121(6) 
TFEU, in which case the European Parliament (EP) would co-legislate the reforms. A realistic plan 
might be to program their prospective implementation after the 2014 EU elections, thereby giving to 
EU citizens a chance to express their support. But preparations should start right away.  
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56 The voting rule under Article 136 TFEU – which allows the euro area countries to adopt measures specific to the EMU– is a qualified 
majority rule defined in accordance with Article 238(3)(a) TFEU. 
57 In the short run, the tasks to be performed by this Directorate could be assigned to DG-ECFIN. $&"
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APPENDIX - Simulations of mutual insurance of macroeconomic risks 
by Jacques H. Drèze and Jean-François Carpantier 
 
In this appendix, we first outline a specific approach to the problem of assigning a present value 
to  bonds  indexed  on  national  incomes  issued  in  order  to  mutualise  (partly)  idiosyncratic 
macroeconomic risks. We turn next to an illustration of the backward implementation of our 
insurance scheme (introduced in section 2.6). 
A.1  We consider bonds that promise to pay each year t = 0, 1,...T (= 11) a fraction $ of a 
country’s national income. 
  We retain the notation introduced in section 2.6 and thus write: yc0,#yct for the national 
income of country c respectively observed at time 0 and estimated at time 0 for time t; Y0,#Yt for 
the sum over c of national incomes (i.e. EMU aggregate income) similarly defined; and "i for the 
annual rate at which national income per capita, in those countries where it is inferior to the EMU 
average at time 0, converges to that average. Label these countries inf and the remaining ones sup. 
It is implicitly assumed that "i > 0 reflects unused resources and potential productivity gains in 
the  inf  countries.  On  the  basis  of  data  in  Figure  2  and  Table  1,  we  set  "i  =  .005  (that  is, 
convergence at the rate of 1/2% per year). We did, however, try alternative values, which confirm 
near linearity of our main results with respect to this rate. Note that higher values lead to higher 
transfers from sup to inf countries. Redistributive goals embedded in insurance contracts could be 
implemented through higher rates of convergence. 
For the remaining (sup) countries, the rate of convergence (downwards) towards the mean, "s, is 
in the nature of a residual and will be estimated.
58 Additional notation consists of: % for the share 
of Y0 made up by the inf countries; vct, Vt for the present value at time t of the national incomes 
of country c and of EMU respectively, as computed at time t for the relevant horizon of T + 1 = 
12 years on the basis of the estimates at time t and of a discount rate r. 
  For transparency’s sake, we assume in this illustration that population is constant in every 
country, so that the rates of convergence for incomes per capita also apply to national incomes. 
This implies, for inf country c: 
yct = (yc0/Y0).#Yt (1 + "i)
t, vc0 = (yc0/Y0).!t Yt (1 + "i)
t/(1 + r)
t := (yc0/Y0).Y*0.               (A.1) 
    Letting V0 := !t#Yt (1 + r)
-t = !c vc0  and assuming that present values within the group of sup 
countries  are  proportional  to  national  incomes  at  0  (on  par  with  inf  countries  in  the  above 
formula), we obtain, for sup country d: 
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58 In 2011, the aggregate national income for the sup countries amounted to roughly twice the aggregate for the inf countries. The 
absolute value of " for the sup countries should thus be about half that of the inf countries. $*"
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  vd0 = (yd0/(1 - %)Y0). [V0 - %!tYt(1 - "s)
t/(1 + r)
t].                               (A.2) 
  The transfers at time t call for each country c (or d) to pay to a central agency a fraction $ 
of its national income, in exchange for a fraction vc0/V0 of the EMU aggregate income. 
  These are the formulas used in our simulations. As for parameter values, we have used "i 
= .005, r = .03 and R = growth rate of Y = .02 until 2007, 0 from 2008 onwards. The choice of 
the rate of convergence "i is tricky, because the data available for empirical estimation are scanty: 
the 12 years 2000-2011, with 4 years of crisis... Any choice entails a margin of error, and it would 
be demanding to model how this parameter uncertainty should be included formally in the risk 
sharing analysis underlying our insurance scheme. Our choice of .005 reflects the data in Figure 2 
and Table 1. We did, however, try alternative values, which confirm near linearity of our main 
results with respect to this rate.
59 As for the average euro area expected growth, .02 corresponds 
closely to the realised rate through 2007. But that realised rate fell to 0 from 2008 on. These 
figures (used in our tables) seem to reflect accurately the expectations entertained at the time. 
A.2  In Table 1, we record the national incomes of euro area countries since 1999. In Table 2, 
we simulate for each year the terms on which mutual insurance would have been contracted, 
namely (vct/Vt). On that basis, we compute, and present in Table 3, the annual transfers for each 
year from 1999 to 2011. For 1999, the transfer is equal to the difference between 3% of a 
country’s national income in that year and the fraction vc0/V*0 of $V0 = .03V0. For 2000, the 
transfer is equal to the difference between 6% of a country’s national income in that year, namely 
vc1, and a fraction of 2$V1 = .06V0 equal to the sum of vc0/V0 and vc1/V1. As can be seen from 
the table, the annual transfers increase from year to year as the relevant fractions of a country’s 
income and of V. are multiplied by the number (t + 1) of elapsed years – thus reaching 12$ = .36 
in 2011. 
  It is interesting to look at the resulting evolution of the total transfers at stake. Table 4 
expresses the data of Table 3 as percentages of realised national incomes, then in the last column 
as percentages of the sum over time of these incomes. Also, Table 4 expresses the sum across inf 
(or  identically  sup)  countries  of  the  transfers  as  a  percentage  of  Vt.  These  figures  invite  the 
following comments: 
a. The total transfers over the period 2000-2011 remain modest, averaging + .72% of cumulative 
national incomes for the inf countries and - .38% for the sup countries. These low figures reflect 
in part the progressive nature of our insurance scheme. For the single year 2011, where the full 
36% of national incomes were insured, while the deviations from year 1999 expectations were 
maximal, the averages become 2.49% for the inf countries and 1.26% for the sup countries. 
60 
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59 Compare Tables 4 and 6. 
60 With "i = .01 (Table 6), the total percentages rise to 1.36 and .72 respectively, and the percentages for 2011 rise to 3.69 and 1.87. $+"
"
b. It is interesting to check from what year on the transfers started exceeding 2% in the inf 
countries. The answer is: 2006 for Portugal, 2008 for Italy, 2011 for Greece; Spain remains below 
1% throughout. This ranking corresponds to that obtained for the 12-year average transfers. 
c. Among the sup countries, Austria and Finland stand out as the two countries with the highest 
contribution rates, attaining 2.2% in 2011 versus 1.6% for Germany and 1.3% for Belgium. Food 
for thought... 
d. The “ex ante non-redistributive” property of our insurance scheme is illustrated by the positive 
transfers to Luxemburg (the per capita richest country) in 2009-2011. 
Remarks b and c confirm the prevalence of national macroeconomic shocks in the euro area. 
A.3  The next simulation bears on backward implementation under the “without” alternative 
mentioned  in  section  2.6.  Assuming  that  the  insurance  scheme  had  been  implemented 
throughout the 12 years period 1999-2011, there would exist today 11 contracts for the coming 1 
to 11 years 2012/2022, entailing for each future year f fractions of 12$Vf = .36Vf equal to the 
sum of vct/Vt over the past years t = f – 12 to 2012. Additional fractions (to keep the number of 
contracts in force equal to 12 for each f) will result from the new contracts agreed in 2013 and 
later. Table 5 gives the extant insurance basis due to past contracts for the years 2012 through 
2022 (percentages of yct and Yt defining the transfers).  
Within each country, the figures are declining over time, in line with the number of contracts still 
in force. If we reflect on the acceptability of this backward insurance scheme for individual 
countries, we are led back to reflect on the issue of assessing properly the parameters underlying 
the estimation of present values. No doubt, that assessment as of today could rest on country-
specific  contractual  agreements  about  structural  policies,  as  discussed  in  section  2.6.  On  the 
whole, the figures are in line with 2011 national incomes, an argument for global acceptability. !
"
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ANNEX I: Table 7 – Summary statistics for investment projects 
Solar energy 
Parameters/Projects  Wind-power b 
PV  CSP 
Low-cost 
housing 
Unsatisfied needs  N/A  N/A# N/A#
1,200,000 units 
i 
Marginal projects  N/A  N/A# N/A# 700,000 units i 
Labour content 
(man-years) 
15.5 EFT/MW  20 EFT/MW  11 EFT/MW  10 EFT/m! 
Supply response 
(risks of bottlenecks) 
Potentially high 
(low) 
Potentially high 
(low) 
Potentially high 
(low) 
Potentially 
high (low) 
Investment cost 
From 1,000! to 
1,350!/KW 
(onshore) 
From 2,000 to 
2,300!/KW 
(offshore) 
2,690!/KW 
From 3,500! to 
5,600!/KW 
(without storage) 
From 4,000! to 
8,000!/KW      
(with storage) 
137,400 ! 
LCOE (on average)a 
From 5c!/KWh to 
10c!/KWh 
From 15c!/kWh 
to 29 c!/kWh 
From 12.5c!/kWh 
to 25.9 c!/kWh 
-   
Sell or rent price     
(on average) 
From 6.61c!/kWh 
to 14.33c!/kWh c 
From 6.61c!/kWh 
to 14.33c!/kWh c 
From 6.61c!/kWh 
to 14.33c!/kWh c 
325 ! per 
month 
Subsidies  Various forms  50-60%  45%  30-35% 
Localisation of input 
production 
Europe d  Europe f  Europe f  Europe 
Localisation of 
output production 
Germany and Spain 
(onshore) 
Northern Europe e  
(offshore) 
Southern Europe g  Southern Europe h  National level 
Note: a For renewable energies, this relates to the levelised cost of electricity calculated by discounting and levelising 
investment and operation and maintenance (O&M) costs over the lifetime of the turbine (around 20 years), and then 
dividing them by the annual electricity production;  b Figures are given for an average capacity per turbine of 2 
Megawatt; c the lowest band is for Greece whereas the upper band is for Germany with other countries in between; d 
with  Denmark,  Germany  and  Spain  as  the  most  important  European w i n d  t u r b i n e  m a n u f a c t u r e r s;  e t h e  m o s t  
important producers are located in Denmark, Ireland, The Nederland, Sweden and the UK; f the main European 
manufacturers of solar material are companies from France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the Netherlands; g European 
countries having the highest solar irradiance are Cyprus, France (Southern part), Greece, Italy, Malta. Portugal and 
Spain but currently actual production is only located in France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the UK; h 75% of CSP 
production is currently located in Spain; i only for the HLM system on average in France.  
Source: IRENA, IEA, EPIA, EPRI, Deloitte, ESTELA, European Commission, EWEA, INSEE, Cabinet Relance; 
own calculations. 
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ANNEX II: Table 8 – Composition of electricity production by sources: 2007 % of total 
  DE  AT  BE  DN  ES  FL  FR  GR  IE  IT  NL  PT  UK  SE 
Coal  20.5  9.7  7.3  50.8  22.4  17.2  4.3  0.0  19.5  14.1  23.7  26.2  34.4  0.4 
Lignite  22.4  0.0  0.0  0.0  1.4  9.1  0.0  54.6  7.7  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
Solid 
subtotal 
42.9  9.7  7.3  50.8  23.9  26.3  4.3  54.6  27.2  14.1  23.7  26.2  34.4  0.0 
Fuel  1.4  2.0  0.9  3.3  6.1  0.6  1.1  15.2  7.0  11.3  2.1  10.3  1.2  0.7 
Gas  11.9  15.3  28.6  17.6  31.1  13.0  3.9  21.7  54.8  55.0  58.0  27.8  41.8  0.6 
Fossil 
subtotal 
56.2  26.9  36.8  71.7  61.0  39.9  9.2  91.5  89.0  80.3  83.8  64.3  77.3  1.7 
Nuclear  22.1  0.0  54.3  0.0  18.1  28.8  77.2  0.0  0.0  0.0  4.0  0.0  15.9  45.0 
Hydr.  4.5  60.5  1.9  0.1  10.0  17.4  11.3  5.3  3.6  12.3  0.1  22.1  2.3  44.5 
Wind  6.2  3.1  0.6  18.3  9.0  0.2  0.7  2.9  6.9  1.3  3.3  8.5  1.3  1.0 
Biomass  4.5  6.9  3.5  9.9  1.2  12.4  1.0  0.3  0.5  2.2  5.3  4.5  2.5  7.1 
Geo-
thermal 
-  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  1.8  -  0.4  -  - 
Average 
cost        
of output 
6.87  5.61  7.14  6.13  6.48  4.80  4.89  4.12  10.96  8.23  8.69  8.71  9.90  7.81 
Source: Cruciani, M. (2010).  
Table 9 – Composition of electricity prices (excluding taxes) in 2007  
  DE  AT  BE  DN  ES  FL  FR  GR  IE  IT  NL  PT  UK  SE 
In ct. !/kWh 
Supply  6.87  5.61  7.14  6.13  6.48  4.80  4.89  4.12  10.96  8.23  8.69  8.71  9.90  7.81 
Routing  7.46  4.89  5.15  5.57  3.56  3.97  4.32  2.49  3.69  8.35  5.31  5.49  2.64  3.09 
Total 
(rounded) 
14.3  10.5  12.3  11.7  10.0  8.8  9.2  6.6  14.7  16.6  14.0  14.2  12.5  10.9 
In % of total 
Supply  48  53  58  52  64  55  53  62  75  50  62  61  79  72 
Routing  52  47  42  48  36  45  47  38  25  50  38  39  21  28 
Source: Cruciani, M. (2010) !%#
#
ANNEX III – Possible cyclical adjustments in the cost of renewable energy 
In order to estimate the cost of producing energy, the calculation of the levelised cost of el ect ri ci t y 
(LCOE) is required, especially to allow comparisons between the different types of energies. This cost is 
calculated by discounting and levelising investment, operating and maintenance costs over the lifetime of 
here a turbine (expected to be around 15-20 years), and then dividing them by the annual electricity 
production as follows:   
 
with I for investment expenditures; M for operations and maintenance; F for fuel expenditure; E for 
electricity production; r for the discount rate; n for the life of the system and t denoting the year t for t=1, 
…, n. Consequently, the first approximation of the return to investor in renewable energy is: 
#
where  is  the  sale  price  of  renewable  energies  with  ps  denoting  the  premium  from  the 
government support (either the feed-in tariff or the quotas/green certificates) and  denoting the 
price of electricity for conventional energies. When &' is set to zero, the price of renewable energies is 
equal to that of conventional energies. Therefore, one way to smooth investment in renewable energies 
could be to find a mechanism for temporary support of feed-in tariffs in at times when the price of 
electricity to final consumers should be temporarily decreased due to a recession. In this case, one could 
imagine the following arrangement: 
# 
where   i s  t h e  p r i c e  g u a r a n t e e d  by  the  State  to  investors  (which  ensures  a  certain  level  of 
investment in renewable energies) and ! is the price of electricity from renewable energies in which ps 
could be set to zero during boom and ps>0 during recession.  
#